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THE PROTOTYPE CARBON FUND:
A NEW DEPARTURE IN INTERNATIONAL TRUSTS AND SECURITIES LAW
By Sophie Smyth*1

INTRODUCTION
he Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change2 (respectively, the
“Kyoto Protocol” and the “UNFCCC”) entered into
effect on February 16, 2005. This was a major step forward in
the world’s efforts to combat the deleterious effects caused by
the emission of greenhouse gases into the stratosphere (effects
commonly referred to as “global warming”).3 However, long
before the Kyoto Protocol4 became effective, several small but
significant steps had already been taken towards achieving its
goals. The World Bank’s establishment of the Prototype Carbon
Fund (the “PCF” or “Fund”) illustrates one such step. The PCF
was a completely new concept in international environmental
law and much has been written about the role it has played in the
development of carbon finance.5 A lesser known fact, however,
reveals that the PCF also broke considerable new ground in the
realm of international trusts and securities law. The latter
aspects of the PCF are the focus of this article. This article
begins by describing the backdrop against which the PCF was
established and the reasons for its development. The article then
describes the novel issues of international trust funds and securities law that were encountered during the Fund’s formation
and the manner in which they were resolved.

T

THE PCF AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The PCF is an outgrowth of the new universe of obligations
and opportunities spawned by the Kyoto Protocol, which
emerged in 1992 when the UNFCCC was signed and ratified by
180 countries (the “Parties”). The UNFCCC remains the first
instance of international recognition of the phenomenon of
global warming.6 Beyond providing that recognition, the
UNFCCC constituted a framework within which signatories
could work towards defining a regime for stabilizing worldwide
concentrations of greenhouse gases. As part of that framework,
the UNFCCC divides the Parties into three categories: (1) all
Parties; (2) all industrialized country Parties (Annex 1
countries); and (3) all industrialized country Parties except those
from the former Soviet bloc in a process of economic transition
(“EIT countries”) (Annex 2 countries). The UNFCCC requires
differing commitments from each category of Parties.7
The Kyoto Protocol, ratified by 141 countries, sets out the
regime presaged by the UNFCCC and contains two essential
elements. First, it puts all Annex 1 countries (which are listed in
Annex B to the Protocol and referred to as “Annex B countries”
under the Protocol) on a timetable to reduce their greenhouse
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gas emissions by an average of 5.2 percent below their 1990 levels over a finite period of time, beginning in 2008 and ending in
2012.8 Second, it introduces several mechanisms by which such
countries can achieve these targets (the “Kyoto Mechanisms”).
Two of those mechanisms, the Joint Implementation
Mechanism, established under Article 6 of the Protocol, and the
Clean Development Mechanism, established under Article 12,9
introduced the concept that a country with obligations to reduce
its greenhouse gas emission reductions under the Protocol, i.e.
an Annex B country, could earn credit towards those obligations
by funding a project in another county which will contribute to
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in that country. The
timetable for reductions, the Protocol’s quantifiable targets, and
the relative imminence of the dates by which they were to be
achieved, prompted immediate action. The ultimate effectiveness of the Protocol was generally regarded as a foregone conclusion and Annex B countries did not want to be caught short.
The Kyoto Protocol’s targets and mechanisms, and the
manner in which their implementation translates into practice,
lie at the heart of the PCF and the niche created for it to fill. With
respect to the targets, Annex B countries pass obligations to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions onto greenhouse gas-emitting
industries through the passage of national legislation that
imposes reduction targets on those industries. Consequently, the
Protocol and the legislation flowing from it create a pool of
government and private sector entities on the lookout for ways
to obtain greenhouse gas emission reduction credits.
The Kyoto Mechanisms created the possibility that an
Annex B country could satisfy its obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by contributing to greenhouse gas
reduction activities elsewhere. This presented a new and
unprecedented opportunity for collaborations between countries
or entities seeking to obtain such credits and developing
countries that could offer a cost-effective way of doing so. The
drastic difference in the cost of undertaking greenhouse gas
emission reduction measures in a developed country or an EIT
country, on the one hand, and a developing country, on the other,
gave rise to this emerging opportunity for collaboration.10 It is
by one or two orders of magnitude cheaper to achieve a ton of
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greenhouse gas emission reductions in an EIT country or developing country than to achieve such reductions in a developed
country; Japan being the most costly country of all for these
purposes.11
The World Bank created the PCF to pioneer implementation of the opportunities offered by the Kyoto Mechanisms to
create win/win collaborations between the developed and the
developing world.12 The Fund was designed to create a central
pool of resources, or a trust fund, managed by the Bank as
trustee and funded by governments and private sector entities
interested in securing greenhouse gas emission reduction credits. The idea was that the Fund would sponsor projects in developing countries and EIT countries that would generate such
credits. These credits would be paid to the Fund, and the Bank,
acting as trustee of the Fund, would distribute the credits to the
Fund’s contributors on a pro rata basis in accordance with the
amounts of their respective contributions. The Fund was the
brainchild of Ken Newcombe, a dynamic division chief in the
Bank’s Environment Department. He envisioned the PCF as a
central fund that would serve as a pilot of the Kyoto
Mechanisms, reap benefits for donors and recipients alike, and
offer, in the process, an opportunity for all parties to devise a
modus operandi for the Kyoto mechanisms, or as he was wont
to call it, an opportunity to “learn by doing.” This vision was
fine-tuned through extensive rounds of consultation with governments and private sector entities across the world that voiced
strong need for and interest in such a fund. It was recognized
from the outset that the Fund was a highly innovative concept,
riding the cusp of the sweeping changes introduced by the
Kyoto Protocol. Less keenly appreciated, however, was the fact
that in creating the Fund, a significant amount of “learning by
doing” would involve trusts and securities law.

A NOVEL TRUST FUND
The Fund represented a new type of business for the Bank,
which was not accustomed to administering a fund that combined both private and public sector contributors, or a fund
under which it had an obligation to generate returns for the trust
fund’s contributors. Five broad objectives had to be reconciled
within the Fund’s design. First, the Fund’s status as an international trust fund had to be reconciled with the participants’
strong desire to exercise extensive control over the Fund’s management and operations. Moreover, the Fund had to accommodate this desire for control with the participants’ equally strong
insistence that they should have no personal liability for the
Fund’s activities. Second, the participants and the Bank wanted
a clear distinction and disentanglement between the Fund’s
operations and the operations of the Bank. Third, the potential
conflicts of interest between the private sector participants in the
Fund and the Fund itself had to be managed. Fourth, both the
Bank and the participants wanted the Fund to include a role for
the countries hosting projects (the “Host Countries”), so that
these countries could gain experience through their involvement
in the Fund’s operations. Fifth, the Bank had to devise a
mechanism to receive, hold, and distribute the greenhouse gas
emission reduction credits that the Fund would accrue.
29

TRUST, AGENCY, OR PARTNERSHIP
The participants’ strong desire to be actively involved in the
Fund’s management meant that the PCF would need a governance structure within which those interests could be expressed,
reconciled, and given effect, while at the same time accommodating a role for the potential Host Countries. All of this had to
be balanced against the Bank’s role as trustee of the Fund, as
well as its ability to have a sufficient say in the Fund’s operations. As a trustee, the Bank requires sufficient say in order to
properly discharge its fiduciary responsibilities; the responsibility to manage and administer others’ money is serious business
with serious legal consequences.
This kind of intricate governance structure was new territory for the Bank. Although the Bank was used to acting as a
trustee (and, indeed was then serving as trustee to well over a
thousand trust funds), it generally had much more unfettered
control. The Bank typically had broad discretion to administer
the funds placed with it in trust under standard trust agreements,
which constituted the vast majority of Bank- administered trusts
prior to the PCF. Standard trust agreements usually contained
broadly worded objectives. The Bank, as trustee, would select
the recipients of trust fund monies within the scope of those
objectives and report annually to the contributors on how the
funds had been used. There was no active, ongoing involvement
on the contributors’ part in those situations.13
In contrast, the governance structure devised for the PCF, as
set out in the Instrument to Establish the Prototype Carbon Fund
(the “Instrument’),14 creates a framework within which the participants can voice their opinions in the Fund’s management and
operations. The structure has five component parts: a Fund
Management Committee, a Fund Management Unit, a
Participants’ Meeting, a Participants’ Committee, and a Host
Country Committee.15 As Trustee, the Bank was charged with
forming the Fund Management Committee16 (which consists of
the Fund Manager, Ken Newcombe, and four other members of
Bank Management) to exercise general oversight over the
Fund.17 Day-to-day responsibility for the Fund’s operations is
vested in the Fund Management Unit, which is headed by the
Fund Manager and consists of a staff of technical and operational specialists selected by him.18
The participants’ active and ongoing involvement is
achieved through the Participants’ Meeting and the Participants
Committee. The Participants’ Meeting is an annual meeting of
all contributors to the Fund19 and is the vehicle through which
participants exercise an overview role over the Fund’s operations. At those meetings, participants review and approve the
Fund’s annual budget and business plan, provide the Bank with
general policy advice and strategic guidance, and approve any
suggestions for amendments to the project selection and project
portfolio criteria.20 The participants also have the power to
terminate the Fund by resolution of a two-thirds majority21 and
the power to authorize the Trustee to remove a participant in
certain circumstances.22
Participants exercise a hands-on role through their involvement in the Participants’ Committee. It consists of five
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participants, two drawn from the private sector and three drawn
from the public sector, who are elected at the Participants’
Meeting and whose membership rotates annually.23 The
Participants’ Committee does not have to give positive approval
to every project funded by the Fund; however, it vets every project proposal to determine whether to object to the inclusion of
the project in the Fund’s portfolio.24 It also provides general
advice to the Bank on the Fund’s operations.25

The Fund involved both
a collaboration and a
conflict between two very
different worlds: the new,
dynamic, fast-changing
world of international
environmental law, and
the more rigid, tightly
construed world of trust
law principles and
financial securities…
The participants’ demand for control over the Fund, risked
jeopardizing their desire to be free of liability for the Fund’s
activities beyond the amount of their contributions. Two sources
of liability were of particular concern to participants: (1) liability for claims against the PCF arising under contracts between
the Bank, as trustee of the PCF and private sector project sponsors (“Project Sponsors”) (the legal entities behind the projects
producing the emission reductions); and (2) liability in tort for
acts or omissions occurring in the course of those contracts. The
extent of the participants’ control under the Instrument gave rise
to the risk that a court faced with a claim in contract or tort
against the PCF might re-characterize the Fund as a general
partnership. Additionally, given the participants’ significant say
in the Fund, a court might conclude that the Bank, when acting
as trustee of the Fund, was acting not simply as trustee but also
as the participants’ agent.

The PCF as a Partnership
Under general principles of trust law, the substantive
powers and decision-making authority afforded the Participants’
Committee make the Fund vulnerable to being re-characterized
as a general partnership.26 While no single power of the
Participants’ Meeting or the Participants’ Committee (e.g. the
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veto power) creates this risk, the active, ongoing involvement of
the participants, provided for throughout the Instrument, makes
the risk impossible to dismiss.27

The Bank as the Participants’ Agent
Similar considerations apply to the issue of when and
whether the Bank, as trustee of the PCF, could also be regarded
as the participants’ agent. Given the participants’ expectation of
receiving emission reduction credits in return for their contributions to the Fund, the participants in the PCF may also be characterized as the beneficiaries of the PCF. The general rule is that
a beneficiary of a trust is not personally subject to liabilities to
third parties incurred in the administration of a trust.28 Hence, a
beneficiary is normally neither personally liable upon contracts
made by the trustee in the administration of the trust nor personally liable to third parties for torts committed by the
trustee.29 However, if a trustee acts on behalf of the beneficiary
and is subject to its control, the trustee becomes the beneficiary’s agent as well as its trustee, and in its capacity as the agent,
it can render the beneficiary liable upon a contract made by the
trustee and for torts committed by the trustee.30 The key factor
in determining whether or not a trustee is also an agent of the
beneficiaries depends upon the extent of the beneficiaries’
right to control the trustee.31 As stated in Restatement (Second)
Agency:
Where a number of persons transfer property to a person, designated as trustee, who is to do business with
such property for their benefit, the relation thus created may be a partnership. Whether or not it is a partnership depends upon the amount of control reserved by
the contributors. If as a group, they have the power, not
merely to elect the trustee, but also to direct the conduct of the business by the trustee, there is a partnership and the person designated as “trustee” is the agent
of the members of the group.32
Despite these risks, the participants did not want to cede
control to the Bank as trustee. Instead, they reached an understanding with the Bank on certain risk mitigation measures. The
Instrument was crafted to provide for the indemnification of the
participants from the Fund’s assets for any liability arising out
of the activities of the trust with the exception of liabilities
resulting from a participant’s gross negligence or willful misconduct.33 The Bank was similarly indemnified as trustee of the
Fund.34 Further, the Instrument provides that neither the Bank
nor the participants will be subject to any personal liability to
any third person in connection with the Fund’s activities.35
Accordingly, the Instrument directs that all contracts
entered into by the Bank as trustee of the Fund shall explicitly
provide to this effect.36 As this provision does not fully mitigate
against the risk of tort liability, an agreement was reached where
the Bank would add the participants as “named insureds” under
its professional liability insurance policy, and the Instrument
authorizes the Bank as trustee to pay for such insurance out of
Fund assets.37 It was also agreed that the Bank would require
the Project Entities, with which it would contract as trustee of
30

the Fund, to maintain appropriate general liability insurance to
protect both the Bank and the participants against general liability claims that might arise from Fund sponsored projects.38

DISENTANGLEMENT FROM THE BANK’S OPERATIONS
The Bank and the participants both wanted to ensure that
the Fund’s operations were kept separate and distinct from the
Bank’s core lending operations. In particular, the Bank did not
want a conflict of interest to arise between its obligations as
trustee of the Fund and its position as lender to Host Countries
of Fund-sponsored projects. The concern arose because, ordinarily, a trustee is under a duty to the trust beneficiaries to
administer the trust solely in the beneficiaries’ interests and to
take reasonable steps to enforce claims held in trust.39 This general principle does not apply, however, if the terms of the trust
instrument expressly provide otherwise.40
Accordingly, the Bank and the participants agreed that the
Instrument would absolve the Bank, as trustee, from any obligation to pursue any action or claim on the participants’ behalf
against any Project Entity or Host Country that defaulted on its
agreements.41 However, the Instrument stops short of determining how such actions or claims will be pursued if the Bank as
trustee does decide to refrain. It simply provides that the Bank
as trustee and the participants will use their best efforts to agree
on satisfactory arrangements for dealing with any such dispute,
including, if necessary the assignment and transfer of all or part
of the Trustee’s rights and obligations under the agreement in
dispute to a third party.42 To date, the provisions of this clause
have not yet been invoked.
To further ensure disentanglement, the Bank and the participants also agreed that there would be no cross-default clause in
the Bank’s loan agreements that would entitle the Bank to exercise remedies if there is a default under an agreement between
the Bank as trustee of the Fund and a Host Country or Project
Entity. 43 Nor will there be any cross-default clause in the latter
agreements that would allow the exercise of remedies under
those agreements if there is a default under any Bank loan agreement.44

MANAGING POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
BETWEEN THE PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPANTS
AND THE FUND
The participants from the private sector did not want their
participation in the PCF to preclude them, or their affiliates,
from investing in projects associated with Fund-sponsored
projects, or in other funds or ventures that might compete with
the PCF. The government participants and the Bank were prepared to accept private sector participants having these conflicts
of interest so long as such conflicts did not interfere with the
integrity of the PCF’s project approval process. Accordingly, a
mechanism had to be devised whereby a participant could
recuse itself from the project approval process whenever it had
such a potential conflict of interest.
Towards this end, the Instrument requires a participant who
has an interest in a project associated with a project being considered for funding by the PCF or is in a venture that competes
31

with the PCF, to disclose that interest to the Bank as trustee,
prior to the Participant Committee’s review of the pertinent
project proposal.45 The Bank as trustee has the authority to
determine whether the participant’s interest is such that it should
not take part in the Participant Committee’s deliberations on the
project.46 If the participant disagrees with the Bank’s determination, it can advise the Participants’ Committee of the conflict
or potential conflict, and the Participants’ Committee (with the
exception of the participant making the disclosure) will decide
whether the participant should be permitted to take part in the
Committee’s deliberations on the project.47 The Bank as trustee,
in consultation with the Participants’ Committee, can decide on
how to sanction a participant who fails to provide timely disclosure of a competing interest.48

THE HOST COUNTRIES’ ROLE
The goal of involving the Host Countries in the Fund’s
work was achieved by including the Host Country Committee as
a part of the Fund’s governance structure.49 The Host Country
Committee is composed of representatives of Host Countries
and potential Host Countries (countries that have given written
endorsement of project proposals under consideration by
the Fund).50
The Host Country Committee provides guidance to the
Bank and the participants on the Fund’s development and implementation, which includes giving advice on proposed amendments to the Fund’s project selection and portfolio criteria and
on effecting an equitable sharing between the participants the
Host Countries of any greenhouse gas emission reductions arising from Fund sponsored projects.51 It meets at least annually at
locations the Bank considers appropriate, so as to allow for
interaction with the participants.52 Further, representatives of
the Host County Committee attend Participants’ Meetings and
Participants’ Committee Meetings as observers in order to further strengthen the interaction between the Fund and the Host
Countries.53 These provisions are ground-breaking in that they
allow meaningful participation by non-contributing developing
countries and EIT countries in the work of an international
trust fund.

ADMINISTERING A PORTFOLIO OF EMISSION
REDUCTION CREDITS
As the PCF was being established to implement the Kyoto
Mechanisms, there was no established modality or consensus as
to the nature of the instruments that would reflect the participants’ interests in their pro rata shares of greenhouse gas emission reductions. The precise nature of the Bank’s obligations as
trustee with respect to such instruments was, therefore,
unknown and the Bank’s responsibilities had to be framed in a
way that took the evolving nature of the international framework into account. Therefore, the Instrument provides that the
Bank, as trustee, will facilitate the process of validating, verifying, and certifying emission reduction credits earned by Fundsponsored projects.54 Additionally, the Instrument explicitly
authorizes the Trustee to carry out this function by engaging
qualified third parties to perform those functions in accordance
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

with relevant standards and criteria “to be developed under the
regulatory framework of the UNFCCC and/or national laws.”55
The Bank as trustee also facilitates the transfer of greenhouse
gas emission reduction credits from the Host Countries to the
participants, although the scope of this obligation to facilitate is
not entirely clear.56 In order to enhance the Bank’s ability to
perform this function, the Bank has the authority to engage third
persons to serve as registrar, transfer agent, or custodians in
respect of the Fund’s property, including instruments evidencing
participants’ entitlement to greenhouse gas emission reductions,
as necessary.57
With respect to reporting obligations to the participants, the
Bank reports bi-annually to participants on the operation of the
Fund and provides each participant with a statement of account
regarding its share of Fund property.58 Further, it agreed to produce a statement of account, at the participant’s request, which
confirms the participant’s pro rata share of greenhouse gas emission reduction credits held by the Fund.59 The Instrument
explicitly exempts the Bank, however, from any responsibility
to ensure that greenhouse gas emission reduction credits earned
by the PCF will be credited under the UNFCCC or the Kyoto
Protocol.60 The most the Bank could undertake was to “endeavor to ensure” that the contractual arrangements entered into
among it, the participants, and the Host Countries and Project
Entities would be “structured flexibly so as to enable them to
conform with the guidelines, modalities and procedures of the
regulatory framework of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol if, when,
and as they are developed.”61

A NOVEL FINANCIAL INTEREST
In addition to the issues regarding the legal nature of the
PCF itself, an additional question arose about the precise legal
nature of the participants’ interests in the PCF. This issue surfaced because the participants expected a return on their contributions to the Fund (the emission reduction credits to be garnered from Fund-sponsored projects), and this meant that participants’ interests in the Fund could, conceivably, be regarded
as securities.62 If such interests were, in fact, securities, then any
efforts undertaken within the United States to solicit interest in
the Fund amongst potential participants would have to be conducted within the defined rubric permitted under U.S. Securities
Laws, or the equivalent of such laws in any other jurisdiction in
which the Fund was being marketed.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF INTERESTS IN THE FUND
FOR SECURITIES LAWS PURPOSES
The Bank pursued the question of whether interests in the
Fund were securities in the Netherlands, Finland, Norway,
Sweden, Japan, Canada, and the United States, countries where
the Carbon Team were conducting conferences, talks, and consultations on the Fund in these countries as a way of soliciting
interest in it. In Europe and Japan, the answer was straightforward; interests in the Fund would not be regarded as securities.
In the United States and Canada, however, the situation was far
less clear; arguments could be made either way. The vagaries of
Canadian law were not a major obstacle as initial interest in the
SPRING 2005

Fund from the Canadian private sector was limited, and Canada
was not a prime target market. The lack of clarity under U.S.
law, however, was a major stumbling block. The United States
was a target market and, by virtue of the location of the Bank’s
headquarters in Washington, D.C., many of the Carbon Team’s
solicitation activities were held in the United States. Moreover,
U.S. Securities Laws have a degree of extra-territorial reach,
depending on whether an issuer’s activities abroad may have an
effect within the United States.63
Although the Bank, as an international organization, is
immune from the application of U.S. and other national securities laws, it voluntarily complies with the requirements of such
laws in all jurisdictions in which it issues securities. The proper
functioning of the Bank depends on its ability to sell its bonds
on the international financial market.64 The Bank goes to considerable lengths to preserve investor confidence in its bonds, in
part, by operating in accordance with the norms and requirements of the national securities laws in the markets where bonds
are sold. Thus, the Bank did not want to risk damaging its good
standing in the U.S. market (one of the largest markets for its
bonds), and the excellent relations it has with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), by acting in a manner,
vis-à-vis the PCF, that was inconsistent with its scrupulous voluntary observance of U.S. Securities Laws and SEC regulations
in respect to its own bonds.
The uncertainty under U.S. law arose from the broad definition of what constitutes a “security.” A “security,” according
to the United States Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,65
is something that creates a “financial relationship” between the
parties and looks like an “investment contract.”66 Further, an
“investment contract,” according to the Supreme Court, has certain key characteristics: it is a contract, transaction, or scheme
whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits, derived solely or essentially from the
efforts of the promoter of the enterprise or a third party.67
Analyzing participants’ interests in the PCF under this definition, interests could be regarded as securities. The Fund gives
rise to a financial relationship between the participants inter se
and between the participants and the Bank as Trustee.
Additionally, it involves the investment of money in a common
enterprise, with the expectation of earning greenhouse gas emission reduction credits which could be derived from the efforts of
parties other than the participants.68
On the other hand, several factors support the position that
interests in the PCF are not securities. The Bank is a development institution, not a for-profit institution, and many of the participants in the PCF are governments. Moreover, PCF’s primary
purpose is to provide an opportunity for all affected parties, participants, the Bank, and Host Countries to pilot the Kyoto
Mechanisms and to “learn by doing.” True, the participants saw
involvement in the PCF as a way of receiving emission reductions credits, and such credits would count against any future
domestic or international legal obligations to reduce their emission reductions that might accrue to them in the future.
However, those obligations were putative, potential future obli32

gations as they were just evolving and in a very nascent state at
the time the PCF was established. Arguably, therefore, the participants’ hope that their contributions to the PCF might at some
point in the future help satisfy those obligations, fell short of an
actual “expectation of profit.”69
The Bank sought SEC advice on how interests in the PCF
should be characterized. Pending receipt of this advice, however, a decision had to be made on how to proceed. Needless to
say, concerns about the precise legal nature of participants’
interests in the PCF were far from the Carbon Team’s radar
screen. Their key concern was to build public and private sector
knowledge and interest in the
PCF, the opportunities it offered
to be involved in piloting the
Kyoto Mechanisms, and the
implications of the Kyoto
Mechanisms for countries and
industry over the long term. The
very newness of the concepts
necessitated an extensive and
aggressive marketing campaign.
Accordingly, they were engaged
in an extensive worldwide effort
to promote the PCF by giving
speeches, holding conferences,
and meeting with government
and industry representatives. In
addition, they launched a public
PCF website. In the face of the
uncertain legal status of interests in the PCF, these marketing
efforts became a cause for concern. If interests in the PCF were
considered securities, then these efforts clearly flew in the face
of U.S. Securities laws and regulations; the Bank had not filed
any information on the PCF with the SEC or followed any of the
SEC’s registration requirements. The Bank had no inclination to
do so because registering with the SEC is a time-consuming
process and is inconsistent with the accelerated pace at which
the Bank was planning to launch the PCF.
Pending guidance from the SEC, the Bank decided to strike
a midway point and to conduct its PCF marketing activities in
accordance with the requirements of the “private placement
exemption” to the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 (the
“1933 Act”).70 Under that exemption, transactions “not involving any public offering” are exempt from the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act.71 The exemption is premised on
the notion that not all investors are equal and that institutional
investors that are sufficiently sophisticated and have sufficiently strong bargaining positions do not need the protections of federal registration.
The parameters of this exemption have evolved through
case law. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the Supreme Court
established guidelines for the application of the exemption.72 It
held that the exemption only applies if: (1) the offering is made
to a limited number of offerees, all of whom have access to the
type of information that would be contained in a registration

statement filed under the 1933 Act; (2) the offerees are sufficiently sophisticated to demand and interpret the information
provided to them; and (3) the offering is of a limited size both
in terms of the number of securities offered and the aggregate
offering price.73 The Court also indicated that the requirement
that the offer be made only to a limited number of offerees is
more readily established if it can be shown that the issuer has a
pre-existing relationship with the offerees.74
The burden of proof for establishing that the exemption
applies lies on the party claiming its protection.75 That party
must show that the exemption’s requirements are met not only
with respect to each purchaser
but also with respect to each
offeree.76 Indeed, the exemption has been held not to apply
where the issuer could adduce
no evidence concerning the
actual number of offerees,
the offerees’ particular characteristics or of a relationship
between the issuer and numerous offerees.77 Further, any
public advertising is regarded
as inconsistent with a claim of
a private offering.78 And the
use of investment seminars and
other promotional meetings
will lead to the denial of the
exemption.79
Thus, the decision to market interests in the PCF within the
boundaries of the private placement exception had wide-sweeping ramifications. The constraint on the nature of potential participants who could be approached and the size of the Fund were
not a problem; the PCF was designed for corporate, not retail,
participants, and the maximum size of the Fund (consistent with
its pilot nature) was $150 million.80 But the constraints on the
number of offerees meant that the Carbon Team had to completely change their way of doing business. It stymied their
wide-ranging road shows and investment seminars, in which
they would convey information on the terms and proposed size
of the fund and predictions relating to its performance and the
value of the greenhouse gas emission reductions it was hoped
Fund-sponsored projects would generate. Instead, the Team’s
communications about the PCF had to be pre-screened and edited by Bank lawyers. Even seemingly innocuous communications, such as several pages of a draft article written for
Environment Affairs magazine, were pre-screened. The Carbon
Team was also restricted in the kinds of meetings they could
hold and on the numbers of attendees they could allow. Further,
they had to dismantle their public website and erect a new one
devoid of anything that could be construed as an exhortation to
participate in the PCF. They erected a separate password-protected site for potential participants, who were given access
once they signed a memorandum of understanding with the
Bank indicating their intention to participate in the Fund.

Less keenly
appreciated…was the
fact that in creating
the Fund, a significant
amount of “learning by
doing” would involve
trusts and securities law.
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These constraints gave rise to many tensions. The rigid
requirements of the private placement exemption were directly
at odds with the Carbon Team’s strong need to market the Fund
and encourage governments and industry to participate. The
Team viewed the constraints as a muzzle and argued that they
would kill the Fund’s prospects for success. The constraints
were also at odds with the Bank’s broader need to highlight its
leadership in international environmental matters and its institutional mandate to be open and transparent. The Bank’s credibility was especially important in the post-Kyoto Protocol world as
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) had already voiced
suspicion of the PCF. NGOs publicly accused the Bank of trying to corner the market in emissions reductions trading. NGOs
also claimed that the Bank was helping the Western World at the
expense of developing countries by plucking “the low-hanging
fruit” that would earn emission reductions credits for those
Western nations.81
Nonetheless, the balance tipped in favor of guarding the
Bank’s reputation and the market standing of its bonds. While
the Bank ran the risk of being sued for failing to disclose information or for providing inadequate disclosure by a disgruntled
participant, the likelihood of this occurring was relatively
remote. Instead, the Bank’s main risk was to its reputation for
violating U.S. Securities Laws. The Bank potentially faced negative press (should the Bank be found in violation of the laws of
its largest shareholder), revocation of its then fifty-year-old legislative exemption from registering its securities in the U.S., and
an investigation of its securities and investment operations by
U.S. Government General Accounting Office, SEC, or similar

entity. The Bank might also face collateral negative effects on
replenishment legislation concerning the Bank’s sister organization, the International Development Association, in the U.S.
Congress and erosion of the benign treatment the SEC had
accorded to the Bank over the years due to its credibility as a
good citizen. The prospect of this parade of horrors meant that
the conservative approach of relying on the private placement
exemption prevailed.

CONCLUSION
Despite facing many new issues and competing needs and
concerns, the Fund successfully closed on April 10, 2000 at the
level of $135 million, and was considered a major triumph in
ingenuity and perseverance.82 From its conception, the Fund
involved both a collaboration and a conflict between two very
different worlds: the new, dynamic, fast-changing world of
international environmental law, and the more rigid, tightly construed world of trust law principles and financial securities
(which in the case of trusts date back to the 1800s and in the
case of securities originates in the U.S. post-depression era of
the early 1930s). Therefore, in addition to being a pilot for the
Kyoto Mechanisms, the Fund also served as a pilot for a new
form of public/private sector international trust fund and for a
new form of security, or quasi-security. Already, its governance
structure has become a precedent; in the five years since it was
established, many new carbon funds have been created for
which the Bank acts as trustee, including, for example, the BioCarbon Fund, the Community-Driven Carbon Fund and separate Italian, Danish and Dutch Funds. The nature of the participants’ interests in those funds remains an open question.
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